Expérience
- Membre, GREGHEC (2015)
- Professeur, Finance, HEC (2015)
- Professeur, Finance, INSEAD (2008 - 2015)
- Professeur, Finance, London Business School (2008 - 2009)
- Professeur visitant, Finance, London School of Economics & Political Science (2007 - 2008)
- Professeur associé, Finance, London Business School (2001 - 2008)
- Professeur associé, Finance, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management (1999 - 2001)
- Professeur assistant, Finance, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management (1995 - 1999)
Formation
- Ph.D., en Economie, École Polytechnique (1994)
- Master in Mathematical Economics, École Polytechnique (1990)
- Diplôme Ingénieur, École Polytechnique (1989)
Enseignement
- Corporate Finance
- Corporate Governance
- Banking
- Limits of arbitrage
- Economics of Organizations
Publications
- “Large Shareholders, Monitoring and the Value of the Firm” with M. Burkart and F. Panunzi, Quarterly Journal of Economics (1997)
- “Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders” with M. Burkart and F. Panunzi, Journal of Political Economy (1998)
- “Equilibrium and Welfare in Markets with Constrained Arbitrageurs” with D. V
Expérience
- Membre, GREGHEC (2015)
- Professeur, Finance, HEC (2015)
- Professeur, Finance, INSEAD (2008 - 2015)
- Professeur, Finance, London Business School (2008 - 2009)
- Professeur visitant, Finance, London School of Economics & Political Science (2007 - 2008)
- Professeur associé, Finance, London Business School (2001 - 2008)
- Professeur associé, Finance, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management (1999 - 2001)
- Professeur assistant, Finance, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management (1995 - 1999)
Formation
- Ph.D., en Economie, École Polytechnique (1994)
- Master in Mathematical Economics, École Polytechnique (1990)
- Diplôme Ingénieur, École Polytechnique (1989)
Enseignement
- Corporate Finance
- Corporate Governance
- Banking
- Limits of arbitrage
- Economics of Organizations
Publications
- “Large Shareholders, Monitoring and the Value of the Firm” with M. Burkart and F. Panunzi, Quarterly Journal of Economics (1997)
- “Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders” with M. Burkart and F. Panunzi, Journal of Political Economy (1998)
- “Equilibrium and Welfare in Markets with Constrained Arbitrageurs” with D. Vayanos, Journal of Financial Economics (2002)
- “Public Trading and Private Incentives” with A. Faure-Grimaud, Review of Financial Studies (2004)
- “Collusion and the Organization of Delegated Expertise” with D. Martimort, Journal of Economic Theory (2007)
- “Limits of Arbitrage: The State of the Theory” with D. Vayanos, The Annual Review of Financial Economic (2010)
- “Imperfect Competition in the Interbank Market for Liquidity as a Rationale for Central Banking” with V. Acharya and Yorulmazer, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics (2012)
- “Legal Investor Protection, and Takeovers” with M. Burkart, H. Muller, and F. Panunzi, Journal of Finance (2014)